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PAGE 01 STATE 239631

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TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER)

SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HERewith FULL TEXT MICHAEL PARKS FRONT PAGE BYLINER, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 31, BALSUN, HEADLINED "WIDE US-SOVIET ARMS TREATY APPEARS CLOSER THAN EVER BEFORE".

2. MOSCOW - THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION APPEAR CLOSER TO AGREEMENT ON A COMPREHENSIVE TREATY LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS THAN EVER BEFORE.

3. THE TREATY ENVISIONED WOULD GO WELL BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE 1972 AGREEMENTS LIMITING INTERCONTINENTAL AND SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES AND ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSES TO INCLUDE MUCH MORE OF EACH COUNTRY'S STRATEGIC ARSENAL.

UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 02 STATE 239631

4. FOR THE FIRST TIME, IT IS REPORTED HERE, THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT POSSIBILITY OF AN AGREEMENT ON ACTUAL REDUCTION, NOT JUST LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS.

5. BUT BOTH AMERICAN AND SOVIET OFFICIALS ARE TEMPERING THEIR OPTIMISM WITH WARNINGS THAT THESE AGREEMENTS ARE JUST IN THEIR PRELIMINARY STAGES WITH MUCH WORK TO BE DONE BEFORE THEY EMERGE AS FORMAL TREATIES.

6. THE BASIC REASON FOR THE OPTIMISM IS THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW ACCORDS DURING DISCUSSIONS HERE LAST WEEK BETWEEN LEONID I. BREZHNEV, LEADER OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY, AND HENRY A. KISSINGER, THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE.

7. WHAT EMERGED FROM THE 15 HOURS OF TOUGH NEGOTIATING BETWEEN MR. BREZHNEV AND MR. KISSINGER IS A NEW "WORKING HYPOTHESIS" THAT WILL BECOME, IF IT BEARS UP UNDER CLOSER SCRUTINY BY BOTH SIDES, THE BASIS FOR A NEW ARMS TREATY.

8. THAT HYPOTHESIS -- ITS EXACT TERMS ARE NOT YET KNOWN, ALTHOUGH MR. KISSINGER SAID IT PROVIDES FOR LIMITATION OF LAND- AND SEA-BASED MISSILES, LONG-RANGE BOMBER FORCES AND OTHER STRATEGIC WEAPONS -- ALREADY HAS PASSED ITS FIRST TEST.

9. TO SEE WHETHER THE PROPOSALS MR. KISSINGER BROUGHT WITH HIM WOULD FORM A VIABLE BASIS FOR A NEW AGREEMENT, BOTH SIDES BROUGHT THEM DOWN TO SPECIFIC NUMBERS OF WEAPONS THAT WOULD BE PERMITTED UNDER A NEW ACCORD.

10. AFTER A SATURDAY MORNING MEETING WITH TOP MILITARY ADVISERS AND KEY MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S RULING POLITICAL BUREAU, MR. BREZHNEV MADE SOME SPECIFIC COUNTER-PROPOSALS, ACCORDING TO AMERICAN ACCOUNTS OF THE TALKS. MR. KISSINGER MADE SOME PRELIMINARY COMMENTS, AND BOTH SIDES ARE NOW EXAMINING THE PROPOSED PRINCIPLES MORE CLOSELY.

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PAGE 03 STATE 239631

11. IF THEY ARE SATISFIED, AS NOW SEEMS MOST LIKELY, MR. BREZHNEV AND PRESIDENT FORD WILL ADOPT THE "WORKING HYPOTHESIS" AS THE BASIC PRINCIPLE FOR THE NEW ARMS AGREEMENT DURING THEIR SHORT SUMMIT MEETING AT VLADIVOSTOK IN THE SOVIET FAR EAST NOVEMBER 23 AND 24.

12. THE TWO LEADERS ALSO WILL AGREE TO ISSUE IDENTICAL INSTRUCTIONS TO THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN NEGOTIATORS AT

THE GENEVA TALKS ON ARMS LIMITATION. THIS LIKELY WILL TAKE ABOUT A MONTH.

13. THESE INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH MUST BE IDENTICAL TO BE MEANINGFUL IF PREVIOUS NEGOTIATING PATTERNS ARE FOLLOWED, ARE THE FORMALIZED PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, REQUIRING SPECIFIC NUMBERS OF MISSILES, BOMBERS AND SO FORTH TO BECOME A FULL-FLEDGED TREATY.

14. THIS IS THE TIMETABLE THAT MR. KISSINGER HAD IN MIND WHEN HE SAID THERE WAS A 50-50 OR "REASONABLE IND WHEN HE SAID THERE WAS A 50-50 OR "REASONABLE

CHANCE" FOR A TREATY IN 1975. ACTUALLY, HIS SENIOR ADVISERS SAID HE IS MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN THAT, FEELING THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME HE HAS ACHIEVED THE "CONCEPTUAL BREAKTHROUGH" HE FELT NECESSARY FOR A NEW AGREEMENT.

15. MR. KISSINGER HIMSELF TOLD NEWSMEN AFTER LEAVING MOSCOW THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME HE FELT MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON WERE "NOT AT TOTAL CROSS-PURPOSES," BUT THAT EACH SIDE SHARED A SIMILAR VISION OF A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT.

16. THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE CLOSER AN AGREEMENT NOW THAN THEY EVER WERE DURING THE 1973 AND 1974 BREZHNEV-NIXON SUMMIT MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

17. THE "WORKING HYPOTHESIS" ADOPTED AT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT TALKS LAST SUMMER, FOR EXAMPLE, FAILED THE INITIAL "NUMBERS" TEST. THE DIFFERENCE IN THE NUMBER OF MISSILE LAUNCHERS THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE ALLOWED EACH SIDE TO OBTAIN AN AGREEMENT WAS TOO LARGE IN THE AMERICAN VIEW; UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 04 STATE 239631

MR. KISSINGER THOUGHT THAT GAP COULD BE BRIDGED AND SAID THE GE EVA NEGOTIATORS WOULD PURSUE AN ACCORD BASED ON THE NUMBER OF MISSILE LAUNCHERS EACH SIDE HAS. BUT THAT APPROACH WAS SCRAPPED UNDER PRESIDENT FORD.

18. SOVIET STRATEGIC ANALYSTS NOW SEEM TO SHARE THE AMERICAN VIEW THAT A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT, ONE BASED NOT ONLY ON THE NUMBERS OF MISSILES BUT OTHER WEAPONS AS WELL, IS A MORE REALISTIC APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL ALTHOUGH THE AGREEMENTS ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE BECAUSE OF THE COMPLEXITY OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED.

19. IF A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT IS CONCLUDED, IT WILL BE MUCH DIFFERENT FROM THE 1970 FIVE-YEAR TREATY LIMITING INTER-CONTINENTAL AND SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES AND

THE 1972 AND 1974 AGREEMENTS LIMITING ANTI-MISSILE
DEFENSE SYSTEMS -- BOTH WERE NARROWLY FOCUSED BEGINNINGS,
CONTRASTING WITH THE BROADER APPROACH NOW BEING NEGOTIATED.

20. MR. KISSINGER'S PROPOSALS WERE DESCRIBED HERE AS
"NOT PARTICULARLY NEW," BUT THE "WHOLE PACKAGE WAS PUT
TOGETHER IN A NEW AND INTERESTING WAY THAT OFFERED
POSSIBILITIES OF NEGOTIATION AND COMPROMISE." END TEXT. INGERSOLL

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